Inside DDP's Buy Plan

In his own words

"If we can incorporate a company at a worst-case scenario of five multiple — four-and-a-half or five — and now I feel like we've created equity for ourselves, created equity into the company. First day."

Chris Fore · 2026-10-29 · Fireflies meeting 01K8RAJJN3A3ZQ1VNCJ19B5S1D

Chris frames acquisition value not as a market exercise, but as equity creation by underwriting. The 4.5× target ceiling is structural, not negotiating posture — it is the price at which a precast plant becomes immediately accretive to DDP's own EBITDA on close. Everything below either reinforces that discipline, or complicates it.

Ten Strengths That Earn Seller Trust

Why a family-owned precast operator should sell to DDP instead of CRH, US Concrete, or a PE generalist.

Three Mispriced Tensions

The lines that make this buyer credible to sellers — and disciplined against bad deals.

1 · Buying Discipline & Price Ceiling

Chris's pricing is structural, not negotiated. The 4.5× target is the price at which an acquired plant's EBITDA covers debt service and adds to DDP's own exit-valuation EBITDA pile. Above 5×, the math compresses. Above 5.5×, the deal doesn't happen.

• AStated ceiling: "Four and a half to five and a half max is more aligned with what I've seen." (Oct 29) — 4.5× is the goal, 5× is concession, >5× doesn't clear.
• AAdjustment discipline: PPP loan forgiveness must come out of the seller's EBITDA stack. $1.8-2.6M in identified add-backs on the panhandle bridge deal. Chris: "did they have that in there?" — he was unaware until Ewing flagged it.
• AOwner-dependency premium: One owner of the panhandle target was also a customer. Chris: "That's a literal owner dependency. That's a concern." Worth a multiple-discount or a 5149 structure, not a deal-killer.
• A$2M of seller debt = 1 year of EBITDA: "Obviously they got 2 million in loans which eats up a year of EBITDA." Chris treats this as paying for the debt twice — once via multiple, once via post-close service.
• ASustainability test: "Their business is volatile, up and down. It gives them a chance to prove the sustainability. They haven't been in business long enough to give me a comfort of the sustainability." (Re: panhandle target — 4 years old, TTM EBITDA dropped from $2.8M to $1.7M.)
• ABank-data over Excel: "We just need bank data instead of somebody's Excel file." No seller-prepared QoE; verified financials only.

"On the top reasons to consider passing — yes, this is something we can look at as passing, but it's also something I think you guys can use to bring it in at that four and a half, or whatever."

2 · Segment Thesis — What DDP Buys, What It Doesn't

The product fingerprint is precise: drainage and sewer infrastructure precast. Five product categories define the wheelhouse. Anything outside is a pass — even when the financials work.

The five-product fingerprint

• APrecast manholes
• AUtility vaults
• ADrainage structures (inlet boxes, drainage pipe)
• ABox culverts
• AReinforced concrete pipe (RCP)

On Atlantic Precast: "I see manholes, inlet boxes, block, their own mix plant on-site, forms under the building, overhead crane. That's exactly what we're looking for."

Explicit exclusions

• AReady-mix concrete — different business, different capital cycle.
• ARoad barriers — distinct product, distinct competitive set.
• ARetaining walls / privacy walls as primary product — Earth Walls (Smyrna GA), Georgia Concrete Precast (Greenville GA) DQ'd. "Even 50/50 like retaining walls and drainage would make sense. But 99% walls — that's not a big interest to me."
• AConcrete cutting / sawing — Woodstock GA target DQ'd outright.
• AFoam manufacturing — Magic Foam DQ'd: "It's Magic Foam."
• AMonument signs — "Okay, but I'm not super excited about that."
• AHigh-end residential — "Oh, no shot. Not interested."
• AGreenfield-only opportunities — "Greenfield plant today is not real sexy. Just to get it off the ground, find the labor force, and the proper management — that's a tough uphill battle."

The deeper test: Day-1 strategic fit

Chris's harder rule, beyond product fit: he must be able to add value Day 1.

"I can't step in day one and improve that because I don't know anything about the market down there. I don't have a good idea of who to market to and how to market it."

This is why DDP's geographic footprint is tighter than its product footprint. A perfect-fit precast operator in upstate New York fails the Day-1 test because Chris has no market knowledge there. The same operator in Tennessee passes.

Geographic priority stack

• ASavannah GA — #1 priority. "I really love the target. Savannah and that whole eastern U.S. is booming. They have a huge port driving their industry. It's always going to be an attractive place." Chris will consider greenfield specifically for Savannah.
• AFlorida (Jacksonville, Sarasota, Orlando, south to Pompano/Homestead) — strong fit on hurricane-corridor thesis.
• AMississippi (home market), Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia — one cultural unit, regional fluency at full strength.
• ALouisiana — "a different country." Chris already operates a Lafayette LA plant he built himself, but cultural identification is low. Open to opportunistic, not strategic.
• ACarolinas, Texas — adjacent expansion zones from prior conversations.

3 · Capital Structure & the Strategic Exit Clock

The hardest constraint on Chris is not money — it is time. Pat's 3.5-4 year exit clock makes every acquisition a question of accretion to a future strategic sale, not just to today's EBITDA.

The strategic clock

"We were a C corp, we've changed to an S. We've got another three and a half to four years to go. We want to take that window, say three to five years, and really target our EBITDA and grow it to where there's going to be the bigger guys that are really going to come look at us. And then we'll just cash out and get out."

— Pat Fore, 2026-10-29

C→S conversion is recently complete, triggering the 5-year built-in gains hold. The window is the hold. Every acquisition must show measurable EBITDA accretion by year 3.5 — or it doesn't belong in the pile.

Deal-structure preferences (Oct 29 deck)

• AEarn-out + seller note: 100% buy with 20% structured holdback for 1-2 years. Ewing: "Most common structure if PE is the buyer." Chris ready to deploy on motivated sellers.
• A5149 (51/49 control split): Chris's preferred structure when the seller drives revenue. Forces the seller to keep referring jobs post-close — they're not paid for the 49% until they hit performance milestones. Pat backed it: "I'm with Chris. One or four."
• APerformance ratchet: deal opens at 4× base; performance milestones unlock 6× ceiling; "bounty of killing it" at 7×, applied only to remainder due. Chris on this: "The ultimate put-your-money-where-your-mouth-is."
• ASales-org gaps treated as upside, not downside. Chris: "No sales team, no formal sales system — I look at those as pluses. What's an $80K-a-year commissioned salesperson going to generate? You do well, they do well."

Engagement economics (Oct 31, settled)

• A2% fee on the existing-bridge deal (DDP brought target).
• A2.5% fee on net-new sourced deals.
• A$30k/month × 3 months retainer ($90K total), applied against close fee. 90-day intent-to-close window before either side can walk.
• AOn 5149 deals: fee payment tracks seller-payment timing. Buyer pays Next Chapter fee on 51% at close; balance on remaining 49% when those performance tranches release.

PE-vs-debt posture

• BBank-first today. Boston Bingham (Gulfport / Birmingham, ~350 attorneys) already closing the bridge deal. DDP is a long-standing depositor with a strong commercial relationship.
• BPE = the exit, not the partner. Pat is explicit: "we'll just cash out and get out." DDP is the platform that PE buys in 3.5 years, not a co-investor today.
• BIf bolt-on funding becomes required mid-cycle, Jones Capital (Duhan, Hattiesburg) is a relationship Ewing already has — "sweaty businesses + tech" thesis. Best fit for a structured partnership, not control transfer.

4 · Target Pipeline State

The hunt: 530 identified precast operators → 473 with websites (qualified ICP) → ~200 working list → 150 reachable → 75 actually-willing-to-talk → 1-2 closes. The funnel is built; the outreach is live.

Active named targets (per Oct 29 / Nov 25 transcripts)

Tag legend: A = active in scoring or outreach; B = on radar but lower priority; C= disqualified or closed. Additional targets (Triple M, Jarrett, The Precast Group / Michael Meridian, Lee's Precast, American Free Cast, Aberdeen Mennonites) appear in Dec 16 / Dec 31 / Jan 15 transcripts — not yet pulled into this brief. See Q5.

Funnel math Ewing's working from

• A530 precast operators identified, 88% with websites (470 qualified ICP base). Plus Tennessee adds more.
• AWorking-list target: 200 → 150 reachable (after phone-number enrichment) → 75 willing (half drop for "kids taking over" / no-sale-ever) → 1-2 closes per cycle.
• AOf Ewing's Nov 25 top-20 list, Chris kept 17-18 ("only 2-3 outside the box"). The scoring model is calibrated.

5 · Integration Playbook

Chris's post-close playbook is light-touch on people, aggressive on commercial. The 3.5-year clock forces speed on revenue lift; the regional cultural fit allows him to keep family operators in seat without conflict.

• ADay 1: hire one ~$80K commissioned salesperson per acquired plant. "If you find the right one and make them heavily commission-based, they do well, you do well."
• ARetain family-member operators if they want to stay. "Especially if they have equity or some sort of earn-out involved" — alignment over loyalty.
• ADefault rebrand to Design Precast. Exception when incumbent brand equity is strong. Decision criterion: "whatever makes the most money."
• AAdd pipe-plant capacity to acquired precast facilities where geography supports it. (Savannah-area targets: this is the wedge.)
• ACultural fit advantage: family-business operator buying from family-business operator. The PE roll-up cannot replicate this — and Chris knows it.

6 · Key Players

7 · Open Questions for Engagement

Six questions Next Chapter still needs to answer before the next major buyer move.

Chris Fore, Verbatim

The voice the team is calibrating against. What he said, in his order.